A Model for Emergency Service of VoIP Through Certification and Labeling

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I. INTRODUCTION

Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP") promises to upend a century-old model of voice telephony by creating a more dynamic marketplace and by changing the point of control from the central office switch to the end user’s device. The transformation to VoIP is only in its very early stages, and it will ultimately impact all sectors of the telecommunications services industry, including traditional incumbent local exchange carriers, cable providers, wireless service providers, and emergency service providers. In fact, all of the relevant stakeholders affected by VoIP (e.g., service providers, hardware and software vendors, customers, and governmental agencies) share a great need to analyze the issues raised by the transition from the traditional Public Switched Telephone Network ("PSTN") to a packet-switched, Internet Protocol-based ("IP") architecture. For example, service providers and hardware and software developers are struggling to understand and take advantage of opportunities in this area involving new technology prospects (e.g., integrated messaging and mobile collaboration). Moreover, business, governmental, and residential consumer users of telecommunications equipment and services are seeking guidance on when and how to upgrade to a new technological frontier. Finally, governmental agencies are struggling to ensure that social policy concerns will be addressed in this very different technological environment.

The social policy implications of VoIP present regulators and incumbent businesses with an unusual dilemma, forcing them to choose from amongst mutually exclusive—and equally unfavorable—options. Under the current PSTN-based voice telephone network, many critical policy goals, such as the provision of reliable emergency services, are implemented effectively and reliably. However, most VoIP services, at least as they exist today, do not deliver the same level of quality and dependability as emergency services. In response, some state regulators have considered passing regulations requiring VoIP to meet legacy and other requirements, regardless of the dramatic differences in the VoIP service’s technical and business models.¹ The Federal Communications

¹ Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993 (D. Minn. 2003). Note that newer service providers have already started to tell consumers that VoIP services may not meet traditional Emergency 911 ("E911") expectations, although they have not yet described what the alternative expectations might be. For example, an AT&T spokesperson, referring to the company’s consumer VoIP service, indicates, “We make very clear to our customers that our CallVantage Internet phone service does not work the same as traditional landline 911.” 911 Calls Made Over Internet Often Get Lower Priority, USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-10-12-voip-trouble_x.htm.
Commission ("FCC") has only begun to develop its regulatory VoIP strategy, although former Chairman Michael Powell made it clear that the strategy would need to differ from the legacy model used in the PSTN context, a position likely to continue in successor FCC administrations. With these thoughts in mind, it is unclear how VoIP services might evolve in a meaningful and timely fashion.

In a number of specific circumstances, however, self-regulation can be a viable alternative to government regulation. Certification, in particular, can be provided by a self-regulatory body as evidence of conformance to required attributes, practices, or policies. Self-regulation has a number of potential advantages, and in the case of VoIP emergency services, we are particularly interested in recognizing information asymmetries between industry and government, given the increase in complexity and heterogeneity inherent in the move from PSTN to VoIP. In order for self-regulation to be viewed as a credible alternative and in order for it to ultimately succeed, it needs to be situated within a careful institutional framework that includes (1) a clear and consistent external motivation (e.g., an incentive in terms of third-party liability); (2) a process for determining the specifications to be certified; (3) identification of certifiers and determination if a competitive market for certification exists; (4) reference to an appropriately neutral accrediting party—a role that government can but does not have to fill; (5) communication of certification to users; and (6) policing of certification. The telecommunications industry has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to self-regulate in areas of interoperability where economic motivation can be relied on to incentivize the activity. In this case, though, the industry should self-regulate in order to address a social policy goal. Success in this area could even help self-regulation become a tool that could be applied in other areas of social policy, especially in the development of new policy initiatives that would otherwise be imposed through government regulation of telecommunications, as has traditionally been the case.

The particular technical challenges surrounding VoIP emergency services arise from two major drivers: variability and location. VoIP can be seen as a much more variable service than traditional PSTN-based telephony, and many new business models and technical combinations are emerging in which quality, methods of initiating and terminating calls, integration with other messaging technologies, and types of terminals

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3. Indeed, we should ask to what extent social policy expectations of emergency services’ response to voice communications should also apply to the many other modes of
(e.g., phones, PDAs, and PCs) have all become heterogeneous. For emergency services in particular, IP networks are fundamentally location independent, and VoIP services may run on IP networks over many different types of wired and wireless access. As a result, these realities challenge a fundamental modern expectation: that an emergency services dispatcher can identify the caller’s location even if the caller does not know the location or is not able to describe it. Although substantial technical progress is being made regarding the provision of emergency services in various VoIP settings, users may not be able to determine prior to an emergency whether the particular service they are employing is capable of emergency service. Accordingly, labeling should be used as a means of specifying the particular level of emergency service capability provided, in recognition of the fact that VoIP’s diversity will preclude a single common requirement for all possible VoIP services. Also, an emergency service testing capability should be made available to the end user.

This Article will describe the technical issues surrounding emergency service in VoIP, examine the status of proposed technical strategies, and identify candidate criteria to be used in certification. Furthermore, this Article will examine the theories behind and examples of successful certification within self-regulatory regimes, including (1) the use of certification in product safety; (2) the use of certification in particular by Underwriters Laboratories acting as certifying institutions; (3) ISO 9000 quality system certification; (4) interoperability certification within the telecommunications industry through Cable Television Laboratories and Telcordia; (5) the Wi-Fi Alliance as a consumer-oriented certification

communication that are now popular or that may become popular, such as e-mail, instant messaging, and video telephony. Given the possible breadth of regulation implied by such an increase in scope, we submit that the option of effective self-regulation would be even more valuable for all of these services than for telephony emergency services alone.

4. For example, VoIP is increasingly carried over Wi-Fi wireless local access networks, and dual-mode phones that can switch between VoIP/Wi-Fi and cellular service are now being marketed. See Corie Lok, One Person, One Phone, TECH. REV., Mar. 2004; Marguerite Reardon, Wi-Fi and VoIP: Is Sum Greater Than Parts?, CNET.COM, Mar. 1, 2004, http://news.com.com/2102-7352_3-5167782.html.

5. VoIP has a number of different signaling frameworks, including the Session Initiation Protocol (“SIP”) and H.323. For the most part, we attempt to proceed in a framework-independent manner in this paper; however, in cases where the framework is relevant, we focus on the SIP framework. We fully acknowledge that development of actual certification standards will need to consider multiple frameworks. Our emphasis on SIP is motivated by technical, market, and policy issues that are outside the scope of this Article. See Glenn Fleishman, An Internet Extension to Your Telephone Twin, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at G3 (explaining in basic terms how a SIP phone works). For a good overview of SIP located at the Internet Engineering Task Force Web site, see generally Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Charter, http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/sip-charter.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
consortium; and (6) general experience with self-regulation in environmental policy. In the end, this Article will synthesize these insights in order to propose specific recommendations on institutional design, technical criteria, and the certification process.

II. EXISTING MODELS FOR CERTIFICATION

This Part presents the results of secondary research into existing certification processes. Drawing on historical analysis and literature review techniques, this research incorporates the collection and analysis of original descriptions, outcomes research on certification processes, and research on the manner in which these processes have been embedded in overall policy systems including government regulation. In the end, this Part offers an overall model for successful certification tailored to the particular technical and industrial circumstances of VoIP.

A. Theory and Practice of Certification

Well-established certification processes are used in professions, such as medicine and law to accredit practitioners, in securities markets by underwriters and auditors, and in product safety and compatibility arenas. More recently, certification and, more broadly, self-regulation have emerged in new social policy settings (e.g., the certification of a manufacturer’s compliance with labor practice expectations in developing countries or with specific environmental practices). Substantial research has created a reasonable understanding of the purpose of certification, as well as of its challenges and drawbacks.

Certification can have both economic and social policy goals. In economic terms, products or services may have attributes, such as quality or safety, that buyers have difficulty ascertaining prior to the purchase. As a result, consumers oftentimes cannot distinguish between products, a situation that leaves little incentive for companies to include the attributes in the first place. Although reputation, brand, and warranties may mitigate this effect, such factors fall short if they are inconsistent or if customers find it too difficult or costly to apply the factors as a recourse. Certification can thus provide an alternate method for reliably signaling attribute distinctions.6 For social policy, certification, as an aspect of self-regulation, can serve as an alternative or complement to government regulation. In other words, certification can be used as a means of avoiding the overproduction of negative social externalities (e.g., pollution) and the underproduction of positive social externalities (e.g., safety policies).

Moreover, certification can offer important advantages over direct “command-and-control” regulation. For example, certification can reduce the demand on government services and, consequently, on required levels of taxation; put another way, certification can better accommodate a neo-liberal reduced-government capability. It can also exploit information asymmetries in which industry participants have more (and better) information than a potential government regulator.7 The direct use of industry information may increase the rate at which regulation can adapt as circumstances change and may also subsequently reduce the need to enumerate all conceivable contingencies, resulting in more flexible and lighter-weight regulation.8 Furthermore, preemptive self-regulation may eliminate the need for industries and their opponents to make politically motivated investments in regulatory policies.9

Self-regulation can also have a moral and cultural effect by inculcating an ethical component in institutional self-image that induces behavior that exceeds mere compliance with the letter of the law.10 Conversely, imposition of rigid regulation instead of self-regulation on sectors that have a strong anti-authoritarian tradition, as commentator Darren Sinclair notes, “can ‘destroy virtue in the business community.’”11 We believe that it is far too early to suggest that the telecommunications industry is incapable of producing its own solutions.

On the other hand, certification can have undesirable side effects that should be anticipated in institutional design. If certifiers are under the

9. In this case, the end result is a Pareto improvement in welfare. See John W. Maxwell, Thomas P. Lyon, & Steven C. Hackett, Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism, 43 J. LAW & ECON. 583 (2000). See also Economist.com, Research Tools Economics A–Z. http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/, which defines Pareto efficiency as follows:
A situation in which nobody can be made better off without making somebody else worse off. Named after Vilfredo Pareto (1843–1923), an Italian economist. If an economy’s resources are being used inefficiently, it ought to be possible to make somebody better off without anybody else becoming worse off. In reality, change often produces losers as well as winners. Pareto efficiency does not help judge whether this sort of change is economically good or bad.
control of the body being certified, certification may be deliberately structured to restrict new entrants and extract monopoly rents for already certified parties, an attribute of guilds that continues in contemporary professions that require certification. A parallel social policy concern relates to the credibility of the certifier, who may be perceived as being too tightly controlled by the certifying body.

Ironically, though, should certification preempt some other form of regulation and succeed in spurring innovation and even new entrants, it is quite possible that incumbents would view the previous form of regulation as preferable even though a broader social perspective would favor certification. For this reason, we cannot conclude with assurance that all industry players will prefer certification even if it benefits both industry as a whole and society at large.

If the certification capability is limited to a single or small number of suppliers of certifications, the certification process itself might capture monopoly rents to the detriment of suppliers or consumers. More generally, even a competitive certifier market can exhibit peculiarities depending on the level of certifier liability, the regulation of the certifier market, and the amount of competition (e.g., situations in which certifiers do not provide

12. See Richard H. Stern, *The Bundle of Rights Suited to New Technology*, 47 U. Pitt. L. REV. 1229, 1259 (1986) (“The incentives provided by the prospect of monopoly rent are the principal rationale for persuading society to permit innovators in technology to exact some monopoly rent.”) Also note that Leland provides a more nuanced analysis of whether licensing results in standards that are too high in order to restrict competition: “If a professional group or industry is allowed to set minimum quality standards (self-regulation), these standards may be set too high or too low. On balance, however, there is some reason to expect too-high standards to be the more likely case.” Leland, supra note 7, at 1342. See also Ulrike Schaede, *Industry Rules: From Deregulation to Self-Regulation*, 28 JAPANESE ECON., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 35, 37–38 (pointing out that a related problem in which apparent deregulation in Japan, replaced by industry self-regulation, did little to weaken trade barriers).


14. In social policy regulation, critics are quick to question the extent to which firms and industries will truly restrict themselves, notwithstanding their stated intentions. To some extent, this debate rests on questions as to whether firms optimize shareholder wealth or take a stakeholder perspective. See Javier Núñez, *A Model of Self-Regulation*, 74 ECON. LETTERS 91 (2001) (discussing the lack of incentives to expose fraud in self-regulation). See also Maxwell, et al., supra note 9, at 584 (stating self-regulation is the alternative to political regulation).

15. Luigi Alberto Franzoni, *Imperfect Competition in Certification Markets*, in ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND SELF-REGULATION 158, 159–60 (Bernardo Bortolotti & Gianluca
all information or choose to provide noisy information). The structure of the certifier market is consequently a non-trivial consideration.

The insurance industry plays a special role in certification as well, especially since certification may signal lower insurance risks, which may then be reflected in lower premiums. Not unexpectedly, insurers need to be able to rely on certifiers’ independence from producers. For example, certifiers that vigorously compete for producer business may compromise the accuracy of certification, such as has happened with recent auditing scandals.17

Closely related to the role of insurance in certification is the role of liability. Liability, of course, already works in partnership with regulation when safety issues come into play, for neither liability nor regulation by itself is generally sufficient to produce socially desirable levels of care.18 From a producer’s perspective, self-regulation that results in an active compliance activity may provide protection against imputation of “intent” to undertake unlawful acts.19 In product liability, for example, a showing of negligence usually requires all of the following elements to exist and requires all of the associated questions to be answered in the positive: (1) duty (did the vendor use “reasonable care”?),(2) breach of duty (was there unreasonable conduct involving an act or a failure to act?), (3) foreseeability (was the problem foreseeable?), (4) proximate cause (did the breach cause the damage?), and (5) damage (did the conduct cause physical injury or some other loss?).20 A widely accepted industry certification or a government-endorsed certification, along with a vendor’s consistent effort in securing such certification, can aid a defense on questions of duty and breach of duty.

A critical question in self-regulation is the appropriate role of

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17. As another example, periodic softness in the market for maritime insurance leads to lax responses to negative certification signals from insurers. See Frank Furger, Accountability and Systems of Self-Governance: The Case of the Maritime Industry, 19 LAW & POL’Y 445, 465 (1997).

18. See generally Steven Shavell, A Model for the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 RAND J. ECON. 271 (1984) (constructing a model showing that regulation does not result in appropriate risk reduction, nor does liability result in that outcome).

19. See also John C. Ruhnka & Heidi Boerstler, Governmental Incentives for Corporate Self-Regulation, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 309, 310–11 (1998) (analogizing self-regulation to certain consequences that can be found in criminal antitrust cases).

government. Pure self-regulation (i.e., regulation without any external influence) is usually rejected based on the lack of evidence showing that this mode naturally arises or is effective. Conversely, a broad correlation between evidence of governmental incentives for the creation of self-regulation and self-regulatory activity seems to suggest that successful and credible self-regulation is consistently coupled with some form of influence or oversight, leading to a model that might be described as co-regulation. Such external influences may come from government entities or, as is apparent in certain contemporary social policy cases, independent nongovernmental organizations with political influence or influence over consumer choice. When influencing the formation of self-regulatory bodies, the government’s manner of signaling its intentions can be important. In fact, game theory suggests that the government should firmly demonstrate zero tolerance of undesirable behavior and immediately invoke direct regulation if such behavior is observed. On a more positive

21. See generally Jorge Rivera & Peter de Leon, Is Greener Whiter? Voluntary Environmental Performance of Western Ski Areas, 32 POL’Y STUD. J. 417 (2004) (noting that, absent oversight, a firm that joins a self-regulatory body may actually have a tendency to underperform when compared with firms that do not join, thus effectively deriving membership benefits without actually investing in the area subject to self-regulation).

22. Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control?: Beyond False Dichotomies, 19 LAW & POL’Y 529, 537 (1997). As Sinclair points out, the tendency in some of the literature to paint command-and-control regulation and self-regulation as stark and distinct alternatives is overly restrictive: Those who are locked into a paradigm which incorrectly assumes that choices have to be made between artificially restrictive models of self-regulation and command and control regulation are unlikely to be capable of appreciating the more nuanced opportunities for achieving both efficiency and effectiveness, which arise from complementary combinations of components of both types of instruments. Id. at 532. Sinclair goes on to list the following four key components, which can be modulated to select a policy on the spectrum between command-and-control and self-regulation: “[The nature and extent of regulatory compulsion; the extent to which regulatory flexibility allows firms to accommodate their individual circumstances; the opportunity for industry design input into the negotiation and development of regulation; and the extent to which win-win outcomes are the focus of regulation.” (emphasis in original) Id. at 533. The legal and regulatory incentives used to influence self-regulation have traditionally been, and often continue to be, primarily “punitive” in nature, though some more recent cases are shifting towards positive incentives that reward corporations for actions that encourage or assist desirable behavior. See Ruhnka & Boerstler, supra note 19, at 309.


note, the government can also encourage self-regulation through a variety of positive signals regarding preferential treatment for diligent self-regulators.25

Three processes that are commonly present in social regulation are also potentially applicable to co-regulation. These three processes are as follows: (1) prior approval, in which firms obtain approval before engaging in an activity; (2) mandatory standards, in which firms are required to comply with the regulation and undergo monitoring; and (3) information disclosure, in which firms are required to disclose facts to buyers that they might not otherwise choose to disclose.26 Interestingly, the framework by which self-regulation is invoked can also result in unanticipated effects. For example, a government-crafted “voluntary agreement” may reduce industry efforts to engage in industry-devised self-regulatory activities, reducing profits and, thus, general welfare.27 This point again suggests that government should apply credible pressure in order to motivate self-regulatory activity, while also exploiting the potential advantages of self-regulation, particularly information asymmetries between industry and government.

On a related note, another necessary element for the industrial self-regulatory component is coherent industry representation.28 Possibilities include bodies establishing standards, industry associations, and the increasingly evident consortia in the information and communication technology industries. Care must be taken, however, especially in the latter group, to mitigate the potential for exclusion and reduced competition.29

On a final note, software, an increasingly important product and component, differs greatly from many of the other types of products that

25. Ruhnka and Boerstler give as examples: (1) the recognition of compliance with self-regulation as a mitigating factor for corporate regulatory violations by regulating agencies, (2) state and federal prosecutors, and (3) in jury instructions and sentencing guidelines, the recognition of self-reporting as a mitigating factor by prosecutors and regulators and the substitution of internal compliance for agency monitoring. Ruhnka & Boerstler, supra note 19, at 314–21.


28. See generally, Frank Welsh, Self-Regulation: The True Key to Success of Physician-Directed Networks, 23 J. HEALTH CARE FIN. 1, 3 (1996) (describing the results of self-regulation in the medical profession and pointing out that increased participation through physician-led efforts is a key to success in self regulation in that field).

have traditionally been certified. Because software can directly affect safety, software reliability is increasingly scrutinized. Certification thus can serve the dual economic purposes of signaling quality to users and reducing the liability of producers. Software often has an iterative and incremental design character, so delaying certification testing until the completion of software implementation can be quite inefficient. Consequently, certification testing is better introduced as an integral part of the internal and regression-testing stages of software design. Interestingly, an organization that embeds certification testing throughout the design cycle can inculcate a culture in which the criteria used for certification become implicit organizational values (e.g., by embedding security certification testing, an organization can help foster a “security culture”). However, implementation of broad software certification processes poses significant challenges. For instance, an organization may find it infeasible to maintain adequate criteria to certify products that change rapidly in function and capability. In such cases, certification may be practical only if it is restricted to aspects of the system that undergo fewer changes and that can be reasonably isolated. Moreover, different types of certification give rise to different challenges. Bruce Schneier, founder of Counterpane Internet Security, Inc., a managed security company in San Jose, California, points out that certifying for security—where threats are active, intelligent, and hostile—is more challenging than certifying for safety, where threats are usually passive and random.

B. Certification Examples

In order for us to appreciate the value that we can derive from a private model of certification, in this Subpart we will review several

30. Software has been subject to certification in a number of areas, most notably in the area of security. The U.S. government developed a set of security certification techniques referred to as the Orange Book. See Reid Skibell, The Phenomenon of Insecure Software in a Security-Focused World, 8 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 107, 127 (2003) (describing the federal government's Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, which is also referred to as the Orange Book Program).

31. Producers of software already have a history of limiting liability through the terms of software licenses. In light of this fact, some advocate an insurance-industry-driven certification regime akin to Underwriters Laboratory-style safety certification. Harold W. Lawson, Infrastructure Risk Reduction, COMM. OF THE ASS’N. FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY, June 1998, at 120.


examples of private and non-governmental organizations that have been successful in this field. By reviewing how other bodies have dealt with self-certification, we will be able to see that our proposal—while relatively new in the software world—is by no means a matter of first impression for technology companies.

1. Underwriters Laboratories and Product Safety Certification

Underwriters Laboratories (“UL”), incorporated as a nonprofit organization in 1901, was initially funded by the National Board of Fire Underwriters to prepare lists of safe products, thus demonstrating the potential benefits derived from linking certification to insurance. When insurance industry funding ceased in 1916, UL became a self-sustaining organization through the collection of testing fees. Today, manufacturers are motivated to seek UL certification because (1) some customers require it; (2) many consumers recognize it as an indicator of product safety; and (3) it can reduce manufacturer liability by supporting reasonable care claims.

Safety co-regulation by government agencies and an industry certifier, Underwriters Laboratories, is apparent in two distinct models. On the one hand, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) sanctions Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories through an explicit accreditation process. OSHA’s decision in 1988 to create a competitive market for testing could not be the result of a strict profit motive on the part of UL because UL is a nonprofit organization. However, absent the discipline of competition, even a nonprofit organization may not evolve or diligently pursue efficiency initiatives. Current UL management is undertaking a
manufacturers to produce and buy certified products from accredited laboratories. The Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC"),\textsuperscript{39} on the other hand, has a less formal relationship with UL. The CPSC actively contributes to the content of UL standards in cases where the CPSC has a direct interest.\textsuperscript{40} In other cases, the CPSC may use public feedback as a mechanism for influencing UL practices.\textsuperscript{41} UL, for its part, actively invests in the government and regulator services it offers. For example, UL makes its information and consulting services available only to regulators.\textsuperscript{42}

2. Telecommunications Certification: CableLabs and Telcordia

Historically, most U.S. social policy goals have been advanced through governmental regulation rather than through self- or coregulation. In fact, for decades antitrust laws in the United States have provided a significant deterrent to industry development of common standards.\textsuperscript{43} European and other international companies, on the other hand, have a long-standing tradition of working together to form common solutions. In 1984, Congress passed the National Cooperative Research Act ("NCRA") in recognition of the fact that U.S. industry can benefit through participation in collaborative standards-setting activities.\textsuperscript{44} Accordingly, the
telecommunications industry has only a very recent history of group certification for equipment interoperability purposes.\footnote{See Tim McElligott, \textit{Six Degrees of Preparation}, \textsc{Telephony}, Oct. 16, 2000, at 48.} This form of certification most directly addresses the economic motivation for certification—interoperability—which is an attribute that is both valued by buyers and difficult for them to ascertain prior to product purchase.

Cable Television Laboratories ("CableLabs"), a nonprofit research consortium founded in 1988, was formed not long after the passage of the NCRA. Funded and controlled by cable operators, generally called multiple system operators ("MSOs"), in the cable television industry, CableLabs leads the development of cable television standards, as well as provides certification and qualification testing for those standards.\footnote{CableLabs standards include the Data Over Cable Services Interface Specification ("DOCSIS") for cable modems and the CableHome and PacketCable specifications. \textit{See CableLabs Certification and Qualification Process}, http://www.cablelabs.com/certqual/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).} Equipment vendors tend to ensure their designs meet CableLabs standards, and they tend to seek CableLabs certification, mainly because many MSOs require certification when making equipment purchases. MSOs, in turn, are motivated to seek out certified vendors in order to increase the supply of interoperable equipment, which makes the equipment more of a commodity—an effect observable in cable modem pricing—and promotes standardization of system design and performance. Testing is performed at CableLabs, and vendors are charged fees that range from $50,000 to $115,000 per product tested, depending on the standard to which conformance is being certified.\footnote{See CableLabs Pricing Schedule for 2005, \textit{available at} www.cablemodem.com/downloads/2005Pricing.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) (explaining pricing for various certification processes).}

Telcordia Technologies, a subsidiary of Science Applications International Corporation ("SAIC"), is a descendant of Bell Laboratories by way of Bellcore.\footnote{Bellcore was established from parts of Bell Labs during the AT&T divestiture in 1984, and SAIC bought the organization in late 1998. Bill Pitterman, \textit{Telcordia Technologies: The Journey to High Maturity}, \textit{17 IEEE Software} 4, July/Aug. 2000, at 89.} The company has traditionally supplied standards, certification,\footnote{See Testing Services, \textit{Telcordia Network Integrity Services}, http://www.telcordia.com/services/testing/ntwk_integrity.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).} and other services to the regional bell operating companies, as well as to other telephone companies and their equipment suppliers. As is the case with the cable industry, telephony industry equipment suppliers pay for qualification testing so that they can meet the certification requirements of telephone operators. Among other areas of proficiency,
Telcordia inherited unique expertise in certifying the interoperability of products with Bell company operations and management databases.

In recent years, Telcordia and the company’s proprietary Operations Systems Modifications for the Integration of Network Elements (“OSMINE”) process have engendered sharp criticism due to the high cost of testing—as much as $2 million per product—and the long duration of test cycles. As a result, the largest regional bell operating company, Verizon, created its own accreditation program and ten labs, including Telcordia’s lab, which are currently accredited to certify compliance against standards important to Verizon. In this case, a large firm, rather than the government, has made an investment in an attempt to create a competitive market for interoperability-oriented certification testing. Moreover, Telcordia now has to compete for certification business. Accordingly, Telcordia’s business strategy has shifted away from providing sole-source research and certification—as was the case in the Bellcore era and as is similar to the case with CableLabs—towards providing a broad array of services and technologies.


Nations may identify accrediting bodies that in turn accredit certification bodies. Not surprisingly, the details of quality systems can vary dramatically depending on the product being manufactured or the service being provided. Meta-standard certification, then, is an attempt to provide useful certification across a very diverse and heterogeneous set of circumstances by focusing on process clarity rather than specific outcomes.

52. The transition of Bellcore from a consortium to a supplier was partly due to increasing competition between the consortium’s member regional bell operating companies. Such competition undermines the viability of consortia. See Pitterman, supra note 48, at 89.
One management practice meta-standard is the International Standards Organization ("ISO") 9000 series of standards, which prescribes quality systems and their documentation and management, typically for manufacturers, although the series has been applied to service providers as well. A firm seeking certification creates and documents a quality system that is both specific to its own activities and in conformance with ISO 9000 series principles. An ISO 9000 certification body (e.g., a commercial firm offering auditing, certification, and consulting) then audits the firm to verify system conformance with the standard and with system documentation.

Companies adopt ISO 9000 for the following reasons: to meet customer certification requirements (particularly those of public sector customers), to reduce the possibility of product liability, and to increase the utility of quality improvement programs in general—consistent with the theme, broadly developed in the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s, that quality improvement increases a firm’s profitability. ISO 9000 certification has grown into its own industry, one that employs numerous consultants, trainers, auditors, and registrars.

As became apparent by the late 1990s, however, the correlation between ISO 9000 certification and product quality is weaker than could be hoped. Task forces in the UK evaluated this phenomenon and determined that this disparity is the result of variable quality among the broad array of certifying agencies. In other words, certification of a quality system does not necessarily take into account the possibility that commitment to the quality process may decrease post-certification or that certification may be viewed as a hurdle to cross rather than as a new quality approach that should be assimilated into the operation and culture of the organization. Recommended changes to the ISO 9000 regime include calls to (1) reduce the number of accredited registrars so that more effort can be spent on accreditation; (2) use product and quality system certifications in combination; and (3) recognize the value of just-in-time practices. Some of these changes are reflected in the more recent ISO 9001:2000.

57. Id. at 1/2.
58. Id. at 1/1.
59. Id. at 1/2–1/3.
framework.60

4. Certification for Consumers: The Wi-Fi Alliance

The Wi-Fi Alliance is a nonprofit trade association founded in 1999 and organized by equipment and component providers interested in the market for IEEE 802.11 wireless local access network equipment. The alliance had more than 200 member companies by July 2004, and it certified interoperability of more than 1,500 products between March 2000 and July 2004.61 As with a number of other consortia, the alliance is intended to augment an otherwise established standards process—in this case, IEEE wireless networking—by providing interoperability certification and by building a consumer brand in order to ensure interoperability of purchased products.62 The Wi-Fi Alliance accredits independent testing labs as Wi-Fi Interoperability Certification Labs.63 These labs report results to the Wi-Fi Alliance, which in turn grants certification and the right to display appropriate Wi-Fi logos.64 While only Wi-Fi members can request certification, the association’s wide membership suggests that barriers to membership are low; in other words, the association does not seem to substantially restrict entry in order to limit competition.

5. Self-Regulation and Voluntary Agreements in Environmental Policy

Environmental regulation has seen the most active experimentation in self-regulation of any area of social policy. A sequence of environmental disasters (e.g., Bhopal, Exxon Valdez, Three Mile Island) and a set of vocal nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) combine to represent public environmental interests, but recent neoliberal trends towards deregulation recognize both the direct and indirect costs of command-and-control regulation. The result has been a wave of self-regulatory experiments in which firms and industries enter into voluntary agreements to reduce


62. Id.

63. Id.

64. See id.
environmental impact.65

The environmental self-regulation experience has been decidedly mixed and has resulted in a number of findings that are beneficial to our discussion of telecommunications emergency services self-regulation.66 These findings include both theoretical and empirical evidence of the detrimental impact of free-riding on effective industry-wide voluntary agreements,67 the importance of external stakeholder involvement in negotiating credible voluntary agreements,68 the critical role of public monitoring of conformance with voluntary agreements by independent parties,69 and the importance of a plausible threat of governmental regulation.70

6. Certification Evolves: Telecommunications Certification Bodies

Until the late 1990s, the regulatory procedure for standardizing and certifying devices for sale to the general public under FCC rules had not changed significantly. For example, a company that wanted to market devices that connect to the telephone network under Part 271 or Part 6872 of

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70. See Madhu Khanna, Non-Mandatory Approaches to Environmental Protection, 15 J. ECON. SURVEYS. 291, 318 (2001); Anna Alberini & Kathleen Segerson, Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve Environmental Quality, 22 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 157, 178 (2002).


the FCC rules (described below) had to first complete a series of tests, which were either performed in the company’s own laboratory or outsourced to a third party. The actual testing process tended to take anywhere from one day to one week, and the test results had to be submitted to the FCC. The centrally controlled FCC approval process took up to three months, and the device could not be properly marketed in large commercial applications until it received FCC approval. The above example highlights the FCC’s device-level command-and-control approach.

The questions, then, are these: what are these FCC rules, and why is device certification relevant in this context? The answer to these questions is simple: virtually every device that connects to the network must meet certain FCC specifications before it can appear on the market. FCC Part 2, for example, is a massive collection of technical data spanning several hundred pages. It covers international regulations, nomenclature and assignment of frequencies, and the complete table of frequency allocations. FCC Part 68, in turn, regulates the connection of terminal equipment to the telephone network, and any device that is regulated under Part 68 (e.g., the limits set for intentional and unintentional radiation) must also comply with the provisions of Part 15. Part 68 is important for future wireless applications because any change in FCC regulations or policy is likely to affect all interrelated FCC compliance regulations simultaneously. In the VoIP area, as we will see, new Internet-enabled telephones will easily span all of these areas and will require certification under many different parts of the FCC rules.

Indeed, even the most banal wireless applications, such as cordless phones, are regulated under Part 68 for their connection to the network, Part 15 for their radiation limitations in a broadcasting capacity, and Part 2 for their placement in the frequency allocation zoning map. In fact, future technologies—like VoIP devices—are likely to dramatically increase the complexity involved in adhering to FCC regulations. For example, regulators used to be able to categorize transmitters and receivers with relative ease in a bygone era when television and radio were the primary subjects of regulation. Today, however, new technological advances are supplanting these categorizations, and hybrid applications no longer fit neatly within any single FCC provision. Examples of these

75. See 47 C.F.R. § 68.2(a) (2004).
recategorizations include frequencies originally intended for UHF television that have been reallocated for cellular\textsuperscript{78} and frequencies originally intended for garage-door openers\textsuperscript{79} that are now used for cordless phones, wireless in-home local area networks ("LAN"), car alarms, and electronic dog fences. Categorization is quickly losing its meaning, and future regulations will likely have to address purely technical criteria rather than application-specific criteria. Although VoIP is sometimes characterized as a revolutionary technology, in terms of its development it is merely one of several hundred new devices or products entering the marketplace.

In 1998, the FCC anticipated that its rules would not be able to keep up with technological advancements, and it shifted away from its traditional command-and-control paradigm by adopting ET Docket 97-94.\textsuperscript{80} The FCC’s action amended certain rules in order to (1) simplify our existing equipment authorization processes; (2) deregulate the equipment authorization requirements for certain types of equipment; and (3) provide for electronic filing of applications for equipment authorization. The proposals were designed to reduce the burden of the equipment authorization program on manufacturers.\textsuperscript{81}

As a result, the FCC shifted the regulatory burden for approval of various devices to the private sector.\textsuperscript{82} The thrust of this action was to organize a provision for so-called Telecommunications Certification Bodies ("TCBs"), whose objective is to conduct various tests and certifications following essentially the same criteria previously employed by the FCC.\textsuperscript{83} Another component of this plan was the adoption of Mutual

\textsuperscript{78} See Inquiry Relative to the Future Use of the Frequency & 806-960 MHz, 46 F.C.C.2d 752 (1974) (discussing the rulemaking procedure that deals with reallocation of UHF channels for cellular telephone services).


\textsuperscript{81} Id. para. 3.


\textsuperscript{83} TCBs are now captured in 47 C.F.R. § 2.960 (2004), and they are described on the
Recognition Agreements ("MRAs") to allow foreign parties to evaluate equipment conformance with U.S. technical requirements.\(^{84}\) The process for approval under the new regulation is quite simple, and many expect it to have an important effect on domestic and international commerce. The case may be most significant in terms of international commerce, where European organizations have enjoyed advances in standardization through Europe-wide groups like European Telecommunications Standards Institute ("ETSI")\(^{85}\) and European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization ("CENELEC"),\(^{86}\) and through country-specific groups like AFNOR (France),\(^{87}\) the famous TÜV (Germany),\(^{88}\) and others. If a U.S. company wants to market a new device to the European Union, the company must seek out a Conformity Assessment Body ("CAB") under Article 10(2) of the Electromagnetic Compatibility Directive.\(^{89}\) A CAB\(^{90}\) is similar to a TCB in the United States. The European CAB then issues a "Technical Construction File," which consists of a technical judgment regarding the overall compliance of a product. If the company receives a judgment in its

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84. *Implement Mutual Recognition Agreements Report and Order*, supra note 82, para. 19 n.36 ("The model APEC MRA provides that countries will identify the relevant regulations and requirements at the time they enter into bilateral agreements.").


90. See John Bengston, *Connecting Terminal Equipment Under the New EC Regs*, COMPUTER LAWYER, July 1992, at 32, 32. The Article outlines the early challenges and regulations facing the European Community. The Article may be somewhat outdated now, but it highlights the challenges of setting up uniformity in the pre-GSM European climate in the early 1990s.
favor, then the device receives the coveted “CE” mark, which can be seen on virtually all electronic devices sold worldwide.

Since roughly 1998, the European process and the U.S. process have grown increasingly similar, and certification bodies and their processes are themselves beginning to standardize on both sides of the Atlantic. In both the European Union and the United States, companies with approved telecommunications devices are expected to keep their certification reports on file in each country where the devices are sold, and the reports must stand up to scrutiny if device approval is ever questioned. A CAB-certified (Europe) or TCB-certified (United States) device may pass all tests, but if a report does not meet with inspector approval or if incorrect test data is discovered, the company in question may be forced to suspend shipments until it presents acceptable proof of conformity. In addition to receiving certification, devices must thus be able to sustain audit.

7. An Expanded Role for Enforcement

It is within this latter inspection and policing capacity that the FCC will continue to perform its own independent surveillance of products on the market using random product testing mechanisms and other procedures to investigate allegations of noncompliance. Ultimately, however, the certification process of the delegates (the TCBs) will help to free up FCC resources, marking the beginning of an ongoing shift in the role of the FCC from command-and-control regulation to ex post enforcement functions. Nonetheless, the FCC remains responsible for issuing certifications to TCBs, which is a responsibility that it shares in

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91. “The letters ‘CE’ are the abbreviation of French phrase ‘Conformité Européene’ which literally means ‘European Conformity.’ The term initially used was ‘EC Mark’ and it was officially replaced by ‘CE Marking’ in the Directive 93/68/EEC in 1993.” What is CE Marking (CE Mark)?, available at http://www.ce-marking.org/what-is-ce-marking.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).


93. For a discussion of changes made and policing functions (including fines), see David E. Hilliard & Kurt E. DeSoto, FCC Refines Computer Marketing Regulations, COMPUTER LAWYER, Sept. 1992, at 27, 28-29. The Article discusses the expansion of enforcement at the FCC level:

[In 1992, the FCC] substantially expanded the enforcement of its computing device marketing rules . . . . The penalties for marketing unauthorized or improperly tested computers or computer peripherals increased [to] . . . (1) civil forfeitures of $75,000 for continuing violations and $10,000 each for other violations; (2) criminal penalties as high as $500,000 in fines and two years in prison; (3) civil litigation; and (4) equipment confiscation. Id. (citation omitted).

94. Implement Mutual Recognition Agreements Report and Order, supra note 82.

95. See Accreditation of Telecommunications Certification Bodies (TCBs) and
certain cases with the National Institute of Standards and Technology,\textsuperscript{96} and the aforementioned rules allow either the TCB or the FCC to revoke the interconnection authorization of terminal equipment. Thus, the FCC still retains an important role in enforcement control, and it may even revoke equipment placed on the market after authorization has been acquired by a TCB.\textsuperscript{97} The law requires the FCC to prove that (1) the equipment approval has been obtained by misrepresentation; (2) the approved equipment causes harm to the public switched telephone network; (3) the responsible party willfully or repeatedly fails to comply with the terms and conditions of its equipment approval; or (4) the responsible party willfully or repeatedly fails to comply with any FCC rule, regulation, or order relating to terminal equipment under the Communications Act of 1934.\textsuperscript{98}

It is not yet known if the enforcement arm of the FCC will prove effective, especially in cases where a TCB certifies the commercial application of a product that subsequently interferes with other entities. Bell Atlantic raised this issue, contending that foreign certification of equipment could introduce partiality into the authorization process and lead to inconsistent application of standards.\textsuperscript{99} Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that the increasing number of FCC representatives at events, such as COMDEX,\textsuperscript{100} where new technologies are often shown to the public,\textsuperscript{101} demonstrates the organization’s willingness to embrace its enforcement role.

The more pressing question, however, is how will the FCC actually go about setting up deterrents to prevent wrongs, such as the proliferation of an inexpensive, uncertified VoIP device that enters the market and takes


\textsuperscript{97} 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review, supra note 96, paras. 13–14.

\textsuperscript{98} Id. para. 15.

\textsuperscript{99} See id. para. 11 (discussing Bell Atlantic's opposition).

\textsuperscript{100} COMDEX is a major technology fair that, until recently, was held annually in Las Vegas. In 2004, the organizers cancelled the event for the first time because of poor participation from vendors. See Jim Carlton, Comdex’s Organizers Cancel This Year’s Show in Las Vegas, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2004, at B9.

\textsuperscript{101} See Hilliard & DeSoto, supra note 93, at 29 (stating that in fall 1991 the FCC issued more than 100 violations to vendors who exhibited unauthorized computer equipment at COMDEX).
off rapidly? It may be difficult or even impossible to recall all of the devices, especially if they realize major sales within a short period of time, such as during the Christmas season. The device manufacturers could be sham organizations purchased through international e-commerce portal sites—or even offshore companies—making them very difficult to monitor from the FCC’s point of view. Only through efficient delegation to third-party authorities (e.g., the TCBs) will the FCC have any opportunity to allocate the resources needed to police the proliferation and e-commerce distribution of new technologies.

8. Certification Processes

Each of the preceding examples involves a certification process from which we can abstract the following common and desirable elements:

(1) Pre-Certification. Certification processes, expectations, and procedures are well-documented, and certification officials have easy access to educational and background materials. If the certification process is sufficiently complex, a third-party community of trainers, consultants, and test equipment providers will participate in certification activities. The goal is to facilitate a standard, straightforward, and repeatable process. Fees are documented, predictable, and reasonable.

(2) Certification. Testing and evaluation against the certification criteria takes place. Certification of easily transportable equipment occurs at specified test facilities, preferably facilities that are conveniently, or even regionally, located. Certification teams go on-site to test equipment that is non-transportable and to evaluate facilities, infrastructures, or processes. Testing is prompt and transparent, and it follows designated guidelines.

(3) Post-Certification. The certifying authority follows a clear process that clarifies deadlines and formats for reporting test results. The reasons for any failures are clearly documented, and comments and recommendations are suggested. The certifying authority follows a clear and transparent procedure for questioning and appealing results and for publicizing successful certification, both by the certifier and by the certified body. A publicly accessible database contains successful certification results. The certification authority documents and institutes a periodic follow-up reinspection process.

C. Implications for VoIP Emergency Services Certification

We can make several general observations about VoIP emergency services certification based on the preceding theories and specific examples of certification. These observations will then inform specific recommendations provided in Part VI. To begin, certification of emergency
service capabilities for VoIP better fits the category of certification for social policy goals than certification for economic reasons, mainly because firms have not traditionally been able to charge consumers for 911 services. The implication is that standards and related certification bodies are not likely to arise unless they are naturally driven by the industry’s own economic interest—as is the case with TCBs, such as Telcordia, CableLabs, and Wi-Fi Alliance.

General evidence suggests that social policy self-regulation requires strong external motivation. In the case of VoIP emergency services, associations of public safety officials, such as the National Emergency Number Association (“NENA”) and the Association of Public Safety Communications Officers (“APCO”), already play an active role in prompting self-regulatory discussions. However, the effectiveness of this external motivation is seemingly derived largely from the presumption that these organizations have the ears of regulators at the local and federal levels. For example, no truly separate nongovernmental organizations play an active regulatory role (e.g., by influencing consumers). Hence, it appears likely that government influence, either direct or indirect, is needed in this case. Such influence can naturally take a number of forms. The government could inspire self-regulation through the credible threat of potential regulation, or it could actively share regulation responsibilities with social policy organizations. Moreover, although the FCC is the most obvious choice to take the reins of such social policy regulatory initiatives, government influence could also come from state agencies—assuming they can be sufficiently coordinated to be effective—or from a combination of federal and state agencies.

In short, social policy self-regulation faces a credibility challenge. Consequently, certification processes should not be held captive to the certifying body, which could make the standards subject to use in extracting monopoly rents (e.g., by restricting industry participation) or could induce the standards to be set at inappropriate performance levels. One option here is the use of a broad-based standards-setting organization that openly invites the participation of other parties, such as government

102. Firms subject to rate regulation may remain relatively neutral toward the imposition of 911 requirements if they are able to recover costs through a general increase in prices. However, we expect many firms involved in VoIP to be excluded from rate regulation and consequently motivated to avoid costs without offsetting revenues unless other issues, such as the threat of government regulation, arise.


104. As noted earlier, standards can be set too high in an effort to restrict competition or too low in an effort to reduce industry costs at the expense of overall welfare.
and consumer organizations. In parallel, it would be valuable to create a hierarchy of trust of accrediting certifiers, whereby the root accrediting organization remains credibly independent of the certified companies. This role of the root accrediting organization can be played by the government, as in the case of OSHA, or by a sufficiently independent group of institutions, as in the case of the ISO 9000 series of standards. The role should probably not be played by a major industry firm, as in the case of Verizon’s testing certification lab, or by a tightly controlled industry consortium.105

Many certification processes that involve conformance testing are overseen by a competitive market of certifiers (e.g., product safety certification, telephone company product interoperability certification, and ISO 9000 quality system certification). Such an approach may work for VoIP emergency services certification as well. Note, though, that implementation of this approach would reinforce the need for a hierarchy of accreditation so that the certifiers’ capabilities can be trusted.

Furthermore, VoIP emergency services certification is likely to consist mainly of software certification. Here, it would be wise to encourage certification processes that engage with software development throughout its cycle rather than solely at the cycle’s end. Also, some aspects of VoIP emergency service performance will depend on network and system characteristics that can be expected to vary widely among VoIP providers. An element of system meta-management standardization and certification, similar to ISO 9000, may be appropriate in such heterogeneous circumstances, but we need to learn from the ISO 9000 experience so that we do not rely solely on process certification to control outcomes.

In fact, consumers can play a key role in discriminating between certified and noncertified firms and between different levels of certification through their buying choices. Examples of such consumer involvement include certification by UL and the Wi-Fi Alliance. However, for the certification to be effective, consumers need to be aware of the certification’s implications and confident in its legitimacy, thus implying an investment in consumer awareness and in policing inappropriate assertions of certification. These functions can be accomplished through the combined efforts of the government and industry trade associations (e.g., the Wi-Fi Alliance), both of which create a brand around

105. While the Wi-Fi Alliance is clearly a membership-restricted industry consortium, it nonetheless has a fairly open membership policy and therefore does not tightly control the behavior of its members. However, even an organization with broad industry membership risks the possibility that opaque and self-interested policies, the kind that are sufficient to undermine credibility, could be implemented.
certification, obtain legal rights to certification marks, and prosecute infringers. Further, individual certified firms, which are generally motivated to promote the significance of certification in order to differentiate themselves from noncertified firms, could also accomplish these functions.

Finally, careful consideration of the role of insurance and liability mitigation could accelerate regulatory progress and industry participation beyond that which would be naturally motivated by the threat of government regulation. Here again, government involvement can potentially help. For example, governmental roles, such as setting appropriate standards and serving as the root accrediting body for certifiers, can enhance the status of standards and the broad acceptance of certification. Insurance industry participation in standards setting and in institutional design of certification is also desirable if it leads to differential premiums for industry participants based on certification.

III. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

This Part provides a technology assessment of VoIP emergency services based on a classification of fundamental trends in technology and protocol models. It will begin by reviewing the basic operations and functions of today’s emergency services. Next, it will discuss the engineering and operations of VoIP systems. Finally, it will describe how VoIP emergency services might be implemented and offer a set of possible (preliminary) VoIP emergency services requirements.

A. Emergency Services and the PSTN

In the context of the PSTN, emergency services in the United States have long been known by the dialing convention 911. When this number is dialed, an emergency call is routed to the appropriate public safety answering point (“PSAP”) and then routed to fire, medical, or law enforcement agencies, as appropriate. Enhanced 911 (“E911”) added a capability that enables the emergency services dispatcher to see the calling number and information about the caller’s location. Regulations imposed on emergency services obligations vary across services, technologies, and local, national, and international borders. In the United States, certain

carriers are required to support 911 service under the 911 Act,\textsuperscript{108} with regulatory responsibility divided among federal, state, and local authorities.\textsuperscript{109}

With traditional E911, the initial routing of a 911 call is provided by the central office, which uses a routing database to associate the caller with the appropriate PSAP. E911 provides calling number information in the Automatic Number Identification (“ANI”) and location information in the Automatic Location Information (“ALI”), and it assumes that the PSAP that receives the call is geographically related to the call origination location. This routing process is accomplished using a selective router database search. The PSAP then accesses a Public Safety-Automatic Line Information (“PS-ALI”) database to associate the calling number with a physical location. At this point, the PSAP may forward the call to an emergency call center, which performs another database search on a database maintained by the telephone company to associate the caller’s phone number with a particular location.\textsuperscript{110}

\textbf{B. Emergency Services and Wireless}

Many of the problems facing VoIP emergency services are similar to those of emergency services for commercial mobile radio service, wireless telephony. Although the technologies are different, some of the same solution mechanisms apply. For example, the development and adoption of wireless emergency service solutions followed a long and convoluted path.\textsuperscript{111} While many of the issues that arose were attributed to technical uncertainty due to an inadequate level of technical understanding early in


\textsuperscript{109}. For example, the 911 Act requires the FCC to take a leadership and support role in implementing wireless 911, but the Act does not give the FCC the authority to regulate statewide plans. See Federal Communications Commission: State 911 Deployment Plans, http://www.fcc.gov/911/stateplans/about.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).


the process, a significant number of the delays were the direct result of industry resistance caused by the absence of strict timelines. Another issue to consider is whether or not certain policy approaches might hasten the development effort. In the wireless emergency services regulatory process, the FCC played a substantial role in specifying and assessing the technical characteristics of the location technology. This initiative consumed considerable time. An industry-led specification and assessment might have hastened this process, particularly if regulatory agencies had monitored the process and set deadlines.

Another issue to consider is that of the implementation itself. Wireless emergency services made use of a phased implementation approach that considered short-term versus long-term solutions. Such an approach can help to promote interim solutions and allow for the creation of reasonable timelines for long-term solutions.112

One important lesson worth considering is this: past regulations should not necessarily be used to define future policy. Different technologies operate in different ways, and these variations can lead to the development of new capabilities and features. For example, as Henning Schulzrinne points out, VoIP offers a number of advantages over voice telephony, including higher resilience, faster call setup, accessibility support, multimedia support, greater cost efficiency, more call data, no telephone reliance, and greater competition.113 In addition, unlike traditional telephony, IP phones do not need to associate with a local central office, and they have little to no need for explicit voice service providers. Instead, the functions of the provider are dispersed and require minimal provider assistance.114 The development of policies that do not appreciate such differences could signal the loss of technical opportunities to better serve society.

112. An FCC news release describes the obligations imposed on certain carriers in terms of providing emergency services. The regulations on carriers are imposed in two phases: the E911 first phase requires carriers to report the wireless caller’s phone number at the location of the antenna that received the call, and the E911 second phase requires wireless carriers to provide the precise location of a 911 caller within 50 to 100 meters. Deployment of the second phase began in October 2001 and is scheduled for completion by December 31, 2005. See Press Release, FCC, FCC Expands E911 Rules (Nov. 13, 2003), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-241214A1.pdf.


C. VoIP Technology

In simple terms, VoIP carries speech over an IP-based network.\textsuperscript{115} The power and complexity of VoIP come largely from its ability to separate functions that were traditionally bound together, such as transport and signaling, thereby providing many more options for each function based on ubiquitous and increasingly inexpensive IP-based networking and IP-compatible access technologies, processing, and storage.

1. VoIP Parameters

IP networks may not offer the same level of performance as circuit-switched networks for voice communications. In order to obtain a similar level of performance, we must explicitly consider specific VoIP parameters, such as encoding, delay, and transport.

On a VoIP telephone call, voice is transmitted over packet networks. This transmission requires the conversion of analog voice to a digitized form, followed by a subsequent encapsulation of the digital content into a packet technology before the content is transmitted using an access technology.\textsuperscript{116} The initial analog conversion process is referred to as encoding.\textsuperscript{117} After the analog content has been encoded into a digital format, the information is packetized with the help of a transport layer\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{115} The difference between VoIP providers and VoIP services is worth considering. VoIP as a product can be offered much like any other software application (e.g., Microsoft Word). Some VoIP products can be installed on a PC and made to run with little or no service provider participation. Some of the simpler products include NetMeeting, which is sold by software giant Microsoft. \textit{See} Microsoft Windows NetMeeting, http://www.microsoft.com/windows/netmeeting/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). Vonage, a service provider, also sells a product that can be loaded onto an individual’s computer. \textit{See} Vonage Softphone, http://www.vonage.com/features.php?feature=softphone (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). Such products make use of the network to reach other end points and rely on so-called intelligence within the product (i.e., software features or information added to the product, such as through software updates). Conversely, a VoIP service provider can augment a product by including additional functionality, routing and database capabilities, security, and more. In this model, the product may still be software, or it may be a combination of physical devices and software coupled closely to the service provider.

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{See} Garrie et al., \textit{supra} note 114, at 105.

\textsuperscript{117} In digital telephony over the traditional PSTN network, voice is usually encoded using PCM-u or PCM-A, resulting in a bandwidth requirement of 56-64 Kbps. However, a variety of different compression algorithms can be applied in VoIP, providing all participating terminals have the required capability. Various algorithms can introduce quality, delay, computation, and bandwidth tradeoffs. For example, G.723.1 reduces the bandwidth usage of the call to 5.3 Kbps, but it also introduces a computational delay of 37.5 ms. \textit{See} DANIEL COLLINS, CARRIER GRADE VOICE OVER IP 102 (McGraw-Hill, 2000).

\textsuperscript{118} Typically, the Real-time Transport Protocol (“RTP”) adds important timing and other information relevant to voice and other time-sensitive media traffic. Next, the User Datagram Protocol (“UDP”) provides limited multiplexing and data detection. Unlike its peer protocol, TCP, UDP does not provide error recovery; instead, error management is left
and passed to the access technology (e.g., Ethernet) for delivery on the network. At the other end, the digital information is retrieved and converted back into analog form, which the listener can then understand. VoIP permits a wider range of choices and tradeoffs among performance parameters than traditional PSTN. These choices and tradeoffs include the following:

(1) Distortion. Low bit rate compression may be bandwidth efficient, but it may also distort speech.

(2) Errors. Voice traffic has some degree of error tolerance (e.g., a small amount of missing information will not impact intelligibility, whereas even a small error in a financial transaction is considered intolerable). However, a high enough error rate from lost packets or errored packets degrades data intelligibility.

(3) Delay. Compression algorithms, packetization, and other stages of packet transmission induce delay. Delays in excess of 250 ms can be annoying, and long delays tend to induce a half-duplex conversation in which each party pauses for a substantial period of time after speaking to determine if the other party wants to speak.

(4) Loaded Networks and Quality of Service. Both errors and delay are affected by whether or not the networks involved in transmitting the voice are loaded (i.e., whether they are subject to traffic that occupies a substantial fraction of their capacity) and whether or not they have some form of prioritization capability (i.e., quality of service (“QoS”)). Loaded networks that lack QoS typically induce long and variable delays, known as jitter, and sometimes drop packets.

(5) Echo. Echo, a traditional issue in analog telephony, can still be an issue in VoIP, depending on the design of the analog portions of the system.

(6) Power. Analog PSTN terminals can be powered by the phone network. Assuming that the phone network has backup power, the system, including 911 service, can remain operational even if the customer premises is without power. VoIP systems do not automatically have such a backup system—although, to be fair, neither do cordless phones, which are connected to the PSTN.


120. See VoIP 101: Circuit Switch Technology (PSTN), http://www.voipreview.org/101.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2005) (providing an overview that compares VoIP with the
For emergency services, we are concerned with the potential impact of these characteristics on the intelligibility of calls and on users’ capability to place emergency service calls during power outages.

2. VoIP Signaling

While the traditional functions of setting up and tearing down calls persist in VoIP, VoIP can augment these functions in many ways by exploiting ubiquitous IP networks and inexpensive processing and storage capabilities. VoIP signaling protocols control these functions, and these protocols continue to evolve and include several variants, which in some cases are competing variants, and in other cases, complementary. The most important variants are the Session Initiation Protocol (“SIP”), H.323, media gateway protocols, and a number of proprietary protocols. Here, we focus primarily on the role of SIP-based systems in supporting emergency services.

SIP, a protocol developed within the Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”), provides for the establishment, modification, and termination of sessions, or calls. A SIP network generally consists of user agents, proxies, registrars, and redirect servers, all interconnected via an IP network. These devices exchange messages in a process used to establish the call, and they do so in a manner analogous to the now widespread packet-signaling system used in the PSTN, Signaling System 7 (“SS7”).

121. Media gateway protocols include the Media Gateway Control Protocol (“MGCP”), MEGACO and H.248. A media gateway might be used to interface between a VoIP network and the PSTN, and a media gateway controller interacts with the signaling systems in each domain and manages the configuration of the media gateway. The separation of voice processing from management and the capability to independently distribute the functions result in an architecture called softswitch. VoIP architectures, in which softswitch and interfacing to the PSTN play a substantial role, generally provide less user control over system behavior. However, such constraints may aid in the implementation of traditional PSTN system functionality, including E911. In any case, this type of architecture will be important for a substantial period, likely measured in multiple decades, while VoIP and PSTN systems must coexist. See Cox Communications, Whitepaper: Voice over Internet Protocol: Ready for Prime Time, 9–10 (2004), http://www.cox.com/about/NewsRoom/files/VoIPreadyMay04.pdf (describing the basic functionalities of VoIP and a media gateway).


123. Two IETF working groups, SIP and SIPPING, are active in the development of session-related protocols. These groups have developed various standards (Requests for Comments, or RFCs) and drafts, and SIP RFC 3261 represents the core protocol. See id.


125. See What is SIP?, http://www.radvision.com/NR/rdonlyres/86D6EBD0-8C2E-
SIP could enable emergency services enhancements by providing richer information set than ANI and ALI. For example, an individual could program a VoIP device to transmit medical records or emergency contact instructions to an emergency calling center via SIP. Such functions, if considered highly desirable socially and executable at a reasonable cost, could easily become subjects of future social policy, or, as this Article suggests, self-regulation.

D. Emergency Services for VoIP

As a basis for a technical model, we turn to the work of the IETF. The IETF has developed several Internet “drafts” and “requests for comments” describing the potential operation of VoIP emergency services based on the use of SIP and associated protocols. This Subpart briefly describes these works in progress and highlights areas relevant to our model. While some of these drafts will not reach maturity, a reasonable VoIP emergency services model should be discernable based on this work.

These proposed VoIP emergency services requirements are based loosely on work within the IETF: (1) support a reasonable QoS connection; (2) use a recognized emergency service number, the equivalent of 911, to identify an emergency call; (3) route calls to the appropriate response group PSAP; (4) establish a means of locating the caller; (5) establish a means of identifying the caller; and (6) establish a means of testing the system. Other concerns involving security or...
network operations are more general to VoIP, though they still may warrant consideration during the process of testing VoIP emergency service operations. Furthermore, mechanisms for privacy, authentication, authorization, and availability will be required.

We should note that much of the operation of SIP-based emergency services would rely on well-established and commonly deployed protocols, including SIP, Domain Name Service (“DNS”), Real-time Transport Protocol (“RTP”), and ENUM. Functionality not provided within these specifications is addressed by the draft documents that establish the SIP community as resolving many of the problems associated with VoIP emergency services. A draft entitled “Emergency Services for Internet Telephony Systems,” for example, describes how SIP might be used to provide emergency services, proposes an architecture based on existing SIP features, and makes use of DNS mechanisms to provide location mapping. A second draft entitled “Emergency Services URI for the Session Initiation Protocol” defines two universal emergency SIP Uniform Resource Identifiers (“URIs”), which can be thought of as emergency numbers like 911, and suggests ways to increase the likelihood of being able to contact an emergency call center.

Moreover, several drafts address the problem of location identification by specifying the use of object formats, privacy mechanisms, and other protocols. Other drafts propose methods of conveying user

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134. See SIP RFC 3261, supra note 122.


136. ENUM is a domain name service that supports the translation between Internet addresses, or URLs, and telephone numbers. See generally ENUM Home Page, www.enum.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).

137. See Schulzrinne & Rosen, supra note 127.


agent capabilities and profiles, both of which help to provide a fully functioning emergency system.\textsuperscript{140} An important emergency service capability is caller authentication, and the SIP specification documents authentication techniques, as do a number of draft documents.\textsuperscript{141} Finally, it is worth noting that the provision of VoIP emergency services needs to account for interfacing between the PSTN and VoIP networks. As indicated in greater detail below, early implementations of VoIP emergency services have been designed largely within the context of interfaced VoIP and PSTN networks, with PSAPs and emergency service responders on the PSTN side.\textsuperscript{142}

A phased approach could be employed to replicate emergency services functionality in the SIP VoIP environment, as described by Henning Schulzrinne and Knarig Arabshian.\textsuperscript{143} In the simplest, and typically initial, case, the SIP elements could connect to the legacy E911 system through a PSTN gateway. In this case, the SIP device would look much like other devices commonly attached to the PSTN (e.g., a private branch exchange (“PBX”)). This scenario requires development of little new technology, though a number of existing mechanisms would need to be considered, such as security, availability, and routing.\textsuperscript{144} Nonetheless, a certification process could be useful in terms of ensuring the accuracy of location information.\textsuperscript{145} Also, a labeling procedure could indicate any additional information that consumers might need. In a second case, the PSAP would be directly connected to, or “aware” of, IP network traffic. In other words, a gateway would not translate INVITE\textsuperscript{146} messages into PSTN signaling messages; therefore, the SIP session would occur between the


\textsuperscript{141} A user authentication capability should help prevent such problems as crank calls. However, a failed authorization could result from an administrative or technical problem. Accordingly, a response mechanism and an authentication policy need to be established.


\textsuperscript{144} Many security and routing technologies already exist. For example, the process of authentication and authorization could be based on existing mechanisms or SIP techniques and later could possibly be based on trait-based mechanisms currently under development. \textit{Id.} § 3.4.

\textsuperscript{145} As Schulzrinne describes, location information may need to be manually configured, measured by the end system (GPS), conveyed to the end system, or provided within the network. \textit{Id.} § 3.3.

\textsuperscript{146} An INVITE message is used in SIP to serve as the mechanism for requesting a session (i.e., a call) with another user. \textit{Id.} § 3.4.
caller and the emergency call center. As a result, the caller and the emergency call center would be able to exchange additional information, such as the patient’s video or healthcare data. In this case, the routing, identification, and location information would probably still reside in telephone company databases; however, the responder could now communicate with the caller using a richer media capability, as a result of direct connectivity over IP, which is able to support multimedia communications. In a third long-term case, the routing, identification, and location information would now reside within the Internet, and the INVITE message would carry the traffic to the PSAP. The elements within the SIP network could gather the appropriate routing and location information using a number of mechanisms (e.g., the use of DNS in mapping locations to PSAPs and emergency call centers). While the details of such a process are outside the scope of this Article, these details may nonetheless prove extremely relevant to the certification mechanisms that could be deployed.

As the preceding paragraphs suggest, VoIP emergency services could be developed by making enhancements to existing SIP-based networks. The point is that these capabilities either currently exist or will soon exist. The challenge now involves the actual implementation of these capabilities, which is where a certification process can help.

E. Technology Requirements

To assist in defining the characteristics of this process, this Subpart will next examine high-level requirements for VoIP emergency services. It proposes that the certification process should first support a phased implementation. While interim solutions are available immediately, some aspects of the longer-term solution will require additional technical development, further industry negotiations with possible regulatory intervention, and considerable investment. Therefore, as Schulzrinne describes, a short-term solution—attaching IP devices to the PSTN emergency services in much the same way as the devices are attached to a PBX—should be available for certification now. A longer-term solution—where IP interfaces with the PSAP directly, the PSAP participates in the IP session, and the databases are IP accessible—should also be specified as soon as possible.

With this phased approach, this Article proposes that the technology specifications should support a range of technologies. For example, a certification process should be developed for other IP services, such as instant messaging or videophone. Further, various levels of specification should be available within a technology. For example, several levels of VoIP certification might be made available (e.g., good, better, and best).
The Subpart below proposes a so-called straw man,—a provisional, exploratory sketch—of the high-level specifications that might be required of a high-quality VoIP service, a “best” service level. Note that this service could be running as software, an IP phone, or another device.\(^{147}\) Also note that this Article focuses on certifying and labeling the VoIP-end device rather than the network.

This straw man framework’s general capability would provide information to end users through such means as device labeling or software notification. It would also provide reasonable quality of service (i.e., meeting the performance and reliability measures previously discussed). System capability would access the emergency services infrastructure and form proper emergency services messages. It also would accurately determine and communicate the proper location of VoIP applications and callers. Finally, the end user capability would participate in an authentication process, initiate emergency services calls using a recognized emergency number (e.g., 911 or SOS), and test the emergency services applications.

The details of how these requirements might be assessed remain to be determined. Furthermore, other requirements also warrant consideration and perhaps some of the requirements listed above merit debate. Accordingly, comments and feedback are welcome.

**IV. Trends in Certification and Consumer Protection:**

**A Brief View of the European and American Approaches**

This Article briefly outlined Europe’s and the United States’ historically different approaches to standardization and certification and asserted that many U.S. approaches have been borrowed from the European tradition. This Article has also contended that the United States and Europe are slowly harmonizing their approaches through the TCBs. How might such a collaborative concept also apply to VoIP? One way is to consider the best mechanism, European or American, for resolving the liability issues that may arise from VoIP product certification. The United States offers a consumer-action-based system of legal redress that contrasts sharply with the preventative measures taken in the European state-based social system of protections. In the United States, citizens can take legal action and seek punitive damages for relief if products do not perform as advertised or if products are defectively designed, manufactured, or labeled. In Europe, however, the state tends to take a more active role \textit{ex ante} (i.e., before products are launched into the marketplace). The

\(^{147}\) While other network requirements exist, these requirements are beyond the scope of this Article.
European approach, then, is to rely on state-sponsored certification, to provide protections to companies that obtain such certification, and to make consumer remedies available only as a last recourse.

Europeans tend to be more precautious _ex ante_ than Americans, and they tend to turn to the state and to organizations like ETSI to help set safety guidelines. In the case of VoIP technology, however, it is almost too late for European and American regulators to implement preventative measures of any kind. Any action, by definition, will be reactive. However, in other areas of technology, such as wireless telephony, Europeans—and to some extent Americans—have not hesitated to impose an oxymoronic _ex post_ precautionary principle, which will be discussed later in this section, to an existing network of wireless telephones.  

Such an _ex post_ approach, if applied to VoIP, will likely be unsuccessful, but it may prove instructive to review some of the differences between European and U.S. approaches in general. As scholar Adam Burgess explains, “Since the 1980s, Europe has increasingly established an identity around concern about vaguely conceived threats to the health of its citizens. Unlike uncaring, free market America, in this scenario, ‘social’ Europe is aware of the threat posed by the dangerous products of ‘unscrupulous’ multinationals.”

It is perhaps helpful to understand that Adam Burgess is a sociologist who recently published a book that tracks the sociological phenomenon of the public’s fear of phones based on the “hysteria factor,” discussed below. In the instance cited above, Burgess purposely oversimplifies the

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148. Fears arising from mobile phones triggered protests in Italy that called for the closure of the Vatican’s broadcast facilities, led to the freezing of wireless deployment in Spain for nearly a year, and caused serious 3G deployment problems in Germany and elsewhere. As a result, many called for the _ex post_ application of the precautionary principle to broadcast emissions. In Italy, the Vatican even turned down the emissions due to hysteria. See Yaroslav Trofimov, *Italians Say Potent Vatican Tower Emits Radiation That Poses Cancer Risk*, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2001, at B7A. Several failed U.S. cases also attempted to attach cancer liability to mobile phone manufacturers. See, e.g., Motorola v. Ward, 478 S.E.2d. 465 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting a claim against a cell phone manufacturer for causing or exacerbating cancer due to lack of causation and inconclusive evidence); Reynard v. NEC Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1500 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (rejecting a plaintiff’s wrongful-death action for lack of causation and for failure of the Daubert test); Newman v. Motorola, 218 F. Supp.2d 769 (D. Md. 2002) (rejecting a cancer claim against a cell-phone manufacturer for failure of the Daubert test); Chernock v. U.S., 718 F. Supp. 900 (N.D. Fla. 1989) (ruling against several workers’ claims against the government for injuries allegedly caused by operating radar devices); Wireless Telephone Radio Frequency Emissions Products Liability, 248 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D. Md. 2003) (preventing claims brought by five classes of phone purchasers who were not provided with headsets for use in guarding against possible danger because federal law sets safety standards and preempts such claims).


150. See generally ADAM BURGESS, CELLULAR PHONES, PUBLIC FEARS, AND A CULTURE OF PRECAUTION (2003) (seeking to explain how these fears came about in the first place—in
problem: America is not “uncaring,” and Europe’s “aware[ness] of the
threat” does not necessarily exceed that of America. What Burgess is
doing, then, is making an insightful cultural point: where the United States
tends to take an ad hoc, laissez-faire approach to consumer harms, Europe
traditionally takes a more precautionary stance. These markedly different
modi operandi and their impact on certification processes cannot be
overlooked.

A. Different Approaches to Product Liability

Interestingly enough, the American and European approaches to
liability have not always been so different, particularly since the United
States once borrowed many of its laws from Europe. Indeed, every first-
year American law student is familiar with a famous judgment that has had
widespread implications on U.S. liability cases. In 1934, Justice Benjamin
Cardozo first articulated and then dismissed the following legal principle,
and he did so in the same judgment: stop, look, and reconnoiter. Cardozo
had to first articulate the principle and then dismiss it because, in the
tradition of common law, the higher courts have to be clear on the
precedent before reaching a different conclusion. In plain English, this
precept was originally derived from advice about stopping a car before
crossing railroad tracks. However, the “reconnoiter” aspect is somewhat
more complicated, for it seemingly stipulates that a driver should stop the
car, get out, inspect the area and look for trains, get back in the car, and,
assuming no trains are approaching, cross the tracks. In this instance,
Justice Cardozo noted that reconnoitering is unnecessary and quite possibly
dangerous.151 In passing this judgment, however, Cardozo reversed an
earlier decision by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who had decreed that
an individual was obliged to get out of the vehicle and reconnoiter before
crossing the tracks.152 Not unexpectedly, Cardozo’s reinterpretation of the
“stop, look, and reconnoiter” provision and the greater application of that
provision in the legal world have had a profound effect on the number of
civil cases involving punitive damages that have been tried in the United

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Standards of prudent conduct are declared at times by courts, but they are taken
over from the facts of life. To get out of a vehicle and reconnoitre is an
uncommon precaution, as everyday experience informs us. Besides being
uncommon, it is very likely to be futile, and sometimes even dangerous. If the
driver leaves his vehicle when he nears a cut or curve, he will learn nothing by
getting out about the perils that lurk beyond. By the time he regains his seat and
sets his car in motion, the hidden train may be upon him.

States during the past seventy years. When Cardozo declared that individuals no longer need to reconnoiter before crossing railroad tracks, he initiated a trend that eventually placed a greater burden on railroad companies, and, in turn, on manufacturers in general. In short, the state would no longer expect individuals to take commonsense precautions to protect themselves from harm; instead, large companies would be held increasingly responsible for any damages caused by their products.

Here, let us take a step back and look at the philosophical and linguistic underpinnings of expressions of precaution. The phrase “stop, look, and reconnoiter” is composed of an unusual mixture of English (stop, look) and French (reconnoiter, a derivative of the French word reconnaître). Indeed, virtually all American law students have to stop, look, and reconnoiter—that is, find a dictionary—when they read the famous case, because the word reconnoiter is not commonly used in the English language. The U.S. approach to consumer protection has changed drastically in recent decades, as encapsulated by the multibillion-dollar sums that tobacco plaintiffs have taken home. Certainly, many of the people who have been diagnosed with or who have died from cancer as a result of smoking cigarettes did reconnoiter the damage that tobacco causes to their lungs, and yet many of these individuals and their families have sought punitive damages and have been compensated accordingly for pain, suffering, and wrongful death by the cigarette manufacturers. As it turns out, the leading U.S. cases for punitive damages have all arisen since the 1980s—and many have since been quashed by the Supreme Court. So, returning to Adam Burgess’s quote above, even if Burgess has oversimplified the American and European outlooks on consumer protections, he is right to say that the divergence between the two world views was set in motion at some point in the past century, possibly even in 1934 with Cardozo’s ruling.

Thus, Americans arguably are no longer expected to reconnoiter; instead, large firms and multinational corporations are seemingly expected to shoulder the majority of consumer risk, and their perceived


accountability for product defects and failures often translates into multimillion-dollar, or even multibillion-dollar, settlements. Nonetheless, the essence of the “stop, look, and reconnoiter” precaution lives on in both American and European culture in commonplace adages, such as “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure,” “better safe than sorry,” and “look before you leap.” These expressions have Dutch, French, and German equivalents, as well as equivalents in other languages. The Hippocratic Oath, which arose out of Greece more than 2,000 years ago, has governed the actions of physicians for centuries and it offers yet another interpretation of what will become known as the “precautionary principle.” According to the oath, each physician is instructed to “prescribe [a] regimen for the good of my patients according to my ability and my judgment and never do harm to anyone.” While the United States has in large part replaced the stop, look, and reconnoiter provision with a legal mechanism for instituting punitive damages, at one point the U.S. system much more clearly resembled the European system. In tying this discussion back to the topic of VoIP telephony, however, we can see that neither Europe nor the United States has properly prepared for the new challenges that will arise from the proliferation of VoIP or for the difficulties involved in developing standards to address emergency services.

156. The following common Dutch phrases are translated more or less directly: “beter voorkomen dan genezen” (it is better to prevent than to cure), “bezint eer ge begint” (reflect before you begin), “beter te hard geblazen dan de mond gebrand” (it is better to have blown too hard than to have burned your mouth), and “een gewaarschuwd man is er twee waard” (one warned person is worth two people).

157. The most common term in French is “il vaut mieux prévenir que guérir” (it is better to prevent than to heal). Such was the title of a recent article in Switzerland asserting that the precautionary principle should be applied to “electrosmog” and to radio emissions in general. Jürg Baumann says that electrosmog is omnipresent in our environment and suggests that the precautionary principle should be applied in a proposed law that would greatly regulate and reduce the installation of new sites. Jürg Baumann, Smog Électrique: Mieux Vaut Prévenir que Guérir, 2 ENVIRONNEMENT 1999, available at http://www.umwelt-schweiz.ch/buwal/fr/medien/umwelt/1999_2/unterseite4/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).

158. The following common German phrases are translated more or less directly: “vorsicht ist die mutter der porzelankiste” (care is the mother of the box of chinaware), “vorbeugen ist besser als heilen” (prevention is better than cure), “man muss das uebel bei der wurzel packen” (grab evil by its roots), and “wehret den anfaengen” (resist the beginnings of something bad). The latter two phrases, outgrowths of Nazi Germany, are often referred to in a political context. For a list of German aphorisms, see www.aphorismen.de (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).

159. “The Hippocratic Oath is thought to have originated some 2,300 years ago on the Greek Island of Cos. It remains today the ‘central document, the most often-cited summary of the physician’s own understanding of what is morally required to be a good medical doctor.’” David L. Katz, Perry v. Louisiana: Medical Ethics on Death Row—Is Judicial Intervention Warranted?, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 707, 714 (1991) (citations omitted).

B. Technological Development Will Forge Ahead in the Face of (Pre)caution

Internet telephony will continue to develop, and the absence of an industry coalition to certify and standardize products will leave an abundance of different standards and concomitant safety problems. In fact, the market drivers for VoIP adoption are overwhelming. For example, Internet telephony will enable foreigners who live in the United States to communicate with their loved ones in their home countries at virtually no cost. Furthermore, products like KaZaA’s Skype, an application-layer terminal, are only in their infancy, and, regardless of what happens with the regulation of E911, these products will continue to develop and appear on the marketplace. Accordingly, the time is now to develop a certification process that affords carriers a level of protection that they can rely on.

As can be observed in the status quo, inconsistent implementation of protective measures in different U.S. states seems to have inspired certain carriers to adopt subversive approaches to network deployment. For example, in spite of political maneuvers undertaken to facilitate network construction, vocal community protest induced companies like Omnipoint to try to build several hundred stealth-antenna sites without municipal authorization during the 1990s. In this particular case, Omnipoint may have concluded that the time and expense required to obtain authorization for the antennas, along with the ensuing public outcry,


The [Commerce] Committee has received substantial evidence that local zoning decisions, while responsive to local concern about the potential effects of radio frequency emission levels, are at times not supported by scientific and medical evidence. A high quality national wireless telecommunications network cannot exist if each of its component [sic] must meet different RF [radio frequency] standards in each community. The Committee believes the [FCC] rulemaking on this issue (ET Docket 93-62) should contain adequate, appropriate and necessary levels of protection to the public, and needs to be completed expeditiously.

Id.

163. See John Cichowski, Antenna Critics Demand Answers, RECORD, Sept. 4, 1997, at L3. Cichowski discusses Omnipoint’s arrangement with the state of New Jersey to put up 122 sites without municipal approval. Because of political pressure, the New Jersey Governor stepped in to provide the municipalities with a veto right. The article also discusses Omnipoint’s stealth erection of these sites in a commercial zone without first obtaining zoning approval. Id. Leslie Haggin discusses an Omnipoint cellular phone antenna that was erected on the side of the Newark Pompton Turnpike without any zoning approval. Municipal authorities forced the antenna to be taken down. Leslie Haggin, Complaints Force Down Cell Phone Antenna, RECORD, May 9, 1997.
would have prevented it from competing successfully with existing providers who had erected antenna sites years prior. Such stealth deployment of wireless sites is not unlike the phenomenon that we are now experiencing with respect to new companies, like Skype, that are selling application-level software for people to run on their PCs. Before we know it, everyone’s computer will be outfitted with not one but several mechanisms that enable voice communications. In the end, an industry-coordinated effort to certify these types of products may help to make the stealth and lesser-known solutions less attractive to consumers.

C. Government Must Respond by Encouraging Self-Regulation

More and more VoIP products are deployed each day, and the certification and associated liability issues will inevitably have to be addressed. A concerted effort of various parties (e.g., academics, consumers, governments, and nongovernmental organizations) will be required to ensure that the growth and deployment of VoIP occur in a sensible way that protects consumers by allowing them access to emergency services. Moreover, even though the effort will need to be coordinated by these various stakeholders, industry must leap to the forefront of this initiative. Along these lines, the government will have to abandon its attempts to control development—particularly in cases where development cannot be controlled—and encourage industry to collaborate in a self-regulatory effort.

As already seen, the government has relaxed antitrust regulation to allow industry consortia to conduct joint research and development through the NCRA. This trend must continue. In the words of science writer Robert Pool:

[for better or worse, technology has changed. Our days of innocence, when machines were solely a product of larger-than-life inventors and hardworking engineers, are gone. Increasingly, technology will be a joint effort, with its design shaped not only by engineers and executives but also psychologists, political scientists, management theorists, risk specialists, regulators and courts, and the general public. It will not be a neat system. It is probably not the best system. But, given the power and complexity of modern technology, it is likely our only choice.]

Pool encourages us to embrace the future development of technologies and to increase our awareness of the roles and impact of these technologies. As he notes, the “power and complexity of modern technology” warrant implementation of a proactive, multidisciplinary, cooperative approach that addresses the challenges of our increasingly technological world.

Of course, the idea that Robert Pool’s “joint [product development] effort” is really our only choice might be challenged by some skeptics. However, the concept is a useful construct for the fast-changing technology sector, particularly in areas, like VoIP, where government regulation has proven that it has difficulty in keeping up with progress.

D. An Ounce of Precaution is Better Than a Pound of Precaution, Particularly When the Opportunity is Lost

As previously seen, the development of emergency services and wireless technologies can be analogized to the development of VoIP. Europeans, for example, have attempted to apply the precautionary principle in wireless deployments. Accordingly, for our purposes it might be useful to briefly explore the possible application of this principle in E911 and VoIP deployments and then dismiss that same possibility—much like Justice Cardozo did when he ruled that individuals may need to stop and look but that they do not need to reconnoiter.

The precautionary principle is a powerful, but extreme, example of governments’ constant struggle between encouraging the development of new and exciting technologies and exerting control over those technologies so as to protect the citizenry. In attempting to define the precautionary principle and bring form to its manifold vague shapes, many scholars have traced the roots of the principle to German law, the Vorsorgeprinzip.165 Particularly in connection with environmental policy.166 The

165. Vorsorgeprinzip, translated literally, means “foresight principle” or “forecaring principle.” A typically vague clarification of what the precautionary principle means can be found in an article written by Nicola Notaro, Environmental Policy, in GUIDE TO EU POLICIES 226 (Gabriel Glöckner et al. eds., 1998). The author notes that the precautionary principle is part of European law and draws a connection between the principle and the Vorsorgeprinzip, though he stops short of any meaningful discussion of its meaning. According to Notaro, the precautionary principle was:

[a]dded by the TEU [Treaty of the European Union] and stems from German environmental law where it is known as the Vorsorgeprinzip. The principle is that whenever there is a strong suspicion that a certain activity may have environmentally harmful consequences, it is better to act before the damage occurs rather than wait for incontrovertible scientific evidence. Id. at 229.

166. See Katherine Barrett & Joel Tickner, Trans-Atlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) Briefing Paper on the Precautionary Principle, (Apr. 23, 2001) (Working Paper, on file with the University of Massachusetts Lowell Center for Sustainable Production). The authors discuss the origins of the Vorsorgeprinzip, associating it with the modern precautionary principle and attributing its origins to a West German movement during the early 1970s. The authors emphasize, however, that the meaning of the term has changed since the 1970s: “It is critical to note that the Germans viewed Vorsorge as a means of stimulating innovation and social planning for sustainability, rather than simply a tool to block potentially dangerous activities.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
Vorsorgeprinzip origins of the precautionary principle are based on the rationale that, as Konrad von Moltke notes, “Environmental policy is not fully accomplished by warding off imminent hazards and the elimination of damage which has occurred. Precautionary environmental policy requires furthermore that natural resources are protected and demands on them are made with care.” The precautionary principle finds its natural home in environmental law, but its exact meaning and the manner in which it should be applied elsewhere, such as to various aspects of telephony regulation, are subjects of great debate and controversy.

Scholars have invested great time and energy in investigating the origins of the precautionary principle and its application to science. While it is correct to credit Germany with the principle’s metamorphosis into a legal norm, it is perhaps more useful to recognize the principle’s more general derivation. Simply put, the precautionary principle is at best just a principle. Thus, the principle is not law, even if it is mentioned in the Treaty for the European Union and other international laws in the United States, Germany, and elsewhere. Kenneth Foster, for one, has examined the precautionary principle as it specifically applies, or could apply, to mobile phones. Foster, an international expert on the effects of wireless signals on human safety, has reached the following conclusions:

The PP [Precautionary Principle] is not a scientific proposition, nor is it a precisely defined proposition in international law; there is some question whether it even qualifies as being a “principle” at all. Rather, it is a counsel for risk aversion, expressed in varying ways in numerous treaties and other documents. In practice, its application is constrained by policies, statutes and case law of individual states and international law.

167. Konrad von Moltke, The Vorsorgeprinzip in West German Environmental Policy, in TWELFTH REPORT: BEST PRACTICAL ENVIRONMENTAL OPTION app. 3, at 58 (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1988) (quoting the West German government).

168. See generally Notaro, supra note 165 (discussing the precautionary principle in the context of European environmental policy).

169. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. Pa. L. REV. 1003, 1003 (2003) (“The precautionary principle should be rejected, not because it leads in bad directions, but because it leads in no direction at all. The principle is literally paralyzing—forbidding inaction, stringent regulation, and everything in between.”).

170. Id. at 1005 (noting the German origins of the precautionary principle).


172. Kenneth R. Foster, Professor of Bioengineering, Univeristy of Pennsylvania,
Indeed, as Foster has suggested, the precautionary principle is no more than “counsel for risk aversion,” the kind that can be found both in our legal systems and in everyday aphorisms (e.g., better safe than sorry).\textsuperscript{173} So, while it may be helpful for lawyers to take note of the German movement that incorporated the \textit{Vorsorgeprinzip} into environmental law in the 1970s and 1980s, it is somewhat shortsighted to draw wide-ranging conclusions from the German movement.

Thus, though we have gained a greater understanding of the origins of the precautionary principle, we are nonetheless left with the following questions: should precautions, or, more specifically, the precautionary principle, be applied to mobile phone safety? To Internet telephony? The answer to these questions, deceptively, is both \textit{yes} and \textit{no}. As might be expected, the general confusion as to how to apply the principle only increases when it is applied within the context of telephony and the different technologies associated with it.\textsuperscript{174} Naturally, we should be cautious, even \textit{precautious}, about products on the marketplace. However, the precautionary principle should not be applied as a matter of law, if for no other reason than the fact that it is \textit{not} law. Accordingly, as we turn to our proposed model for regulation, we wish to emphasize that the unfortunate alternative to a self-regulatory certification process may be the largely unproductive \textit{ex post} application of precaution through some form of the precautionary principle.

\textbf{V. A PROPOSED MODEL}

This Part will present a specific institutional framework and a set of summary technical criteria and procedure recommendations in order to provide a concrete model of a capability for emergency services self-regulation and certification. Other models could be developed. However, this proposed model represents the authors’ best recommendation based on current information and understanding.

\textbf{A. Institutional Design}

This Subpart refines the general observations of Part III into the following recommendation: Government agencies should perform some initial coordination between federal and state levels and then publicize a

\textsuperscript{173} Id.
\textsuperscript{174} See Burgess, \textit{supra} note 149, at 15.
consistent and credible statement of intent to regulate VoIP emergency services unless credible self-regulation emerges. At the same time, government agencies should move to facilitate successful self-regulation, as described infra.

1. Industry Should Organize

Industry service and equipment providers should form an organization to pursue VoIP emergency services. Such an organization could be a derivative of an existing industry trade association or consortium, and it should have the following characteristics: (1) it should be funded by and heavily involve industry participants; (2) it should remain intentionally open and transparent to all industry participants and other stakeholders, particularly regulators and consumer interest groups—such arrangements should be codified in the organization’s bylaws; and (3) it should develop standards, as well as update and extend them. Traditional open standards bodies, such as IETF, the ISO, and the American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”) can serve as models. Although the body would initially focus on emergency services, it could eventually embrace other social policy self-regulation goals as well. This organization should also do the following: create a brand around the certification, establish the appropriate legal protections, act as a co-sponsor with the government to promote public awareness of the certification, maintain a database of accreditations, and police accreditations. The standardization activity would draw on the momentum built by the Voice on the Net (“VON”) Coalition, an alliance between NENA and several VoIP industry participants. The VON Coalition is described in more detail on the following pages.

2. A Separation of Powers Should be Established

While organizing industry into consortia for appropriate standards-setting efforts is a great start, an additional step is needed. In particular, the process should not be held captive to the interests of certified parties. Concretely, this Article recommends implementation of two specific “separation of power” elements in order to enhance the credibility of the process. First, multiple independent and competitive testing organizations

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175. The motivation for new social policy goals could not be expected to arise naturally from the industry participants in this organization. As indicated elsewhere, an external motivation is needed. Most likely, such a motivation would come in the form of a public debate culminating in a credible threat of government intervention. The close coordination with government that this Article proposes could facilitate the efficient signaling of such events.

should perform accreditation. Furthermore, either these organizations or third parties should provide precertification consulting and training. Second, these testing organizations should be accredited by a third party, distinct from both the standards-setting and certification branding organization and from the testing organizations. The two major candidates for this role are a government agency and an independent institution (e.g., a respected neutral institution, such as ANSI).

3. Industry and Government Should Work Hand in Hand

In order to facilitate these ends, government agencies should appoint personnel to assist in the formation of the self-regulation process as follows: (1) credibly transmit the threat of government regulation if self-regulation fails; (2) report back to the government the level of progress made; (3) ensure agency experts provide input into certification standards and process design; (4) promote self-regulation elsewhere in government by recognizing self-regulatory efforts as mitigating factors in punitive proceedings; (5) educate users about certification—both industry and government should co-sponsor this goal; (6) work with the telecommunications industry in order to incorporate the insurance industry in the process and clarify the level of liability mitigation beyond government liability mitigation provided to those who diligently certify products; and (7) liaise with other interested government parties (e.g., Congress).

Although the preceding responsibilities will require significant effort, their implementation will require dramatically less effort than that required to create and execute government command-and-control regulation. That said, it should be clear that this Article is by no means advocating a passive government role.

B. Technical Approach

Ideally, this transition to an IP-based emergency services solution should not burden future models with legacy assumptions. The design, function, and operation of the Internet provide an abundant set of possible solutions, and policy addressing future emergency services should embrace this flexibility and optimize the potential social benefits. The policy thus (1) should not restrict the manner in which a function is provided; (2) should support multiple implementation methods; (3) should encourage the incorporation of emergency services into other technologies; and (4) should encourage developers to create cheaper, better, and more feature-rich technologies.

Certification will likely need to include both certification of terminals,
which can potentially be transported to a test site, and certification of network characteristics, which cannot. This Article focuses only on the former, mainly because it is difficult, if not impossible, to exhaustively test all network nodes and usage combinations as a part of certification. With these thoughts in mind, network testing should use a meta-standard style process certification focused on (1) the way in which the network is designed and managed to maintain an emergency services capability; and (2) random performance testing of particular nodes and situations.

The diversity of possible VoIP systems will most likely preclude the possibility of certification to a single level of performance. This diversity should be encouraged. Consequently, this Article proposes that different levels of capability be certified, keeping in mind that the number of levels needs to be small enough that consumers can distinguish them. VoIP systems might, for example, have two certification levels: a carrier grade level with significant requirements and a noncarrier grade level with less strenuous requirements.

As part of the proposed implementation plan, this Article recommends the use of the stages suggested in the NENA/VON Coalition initial agreement on VoIP emergency services. These stages, or phases, are as follows:

Phase One Certification based on the NENA/VON Coalition interim solution would include (1) delivering a 911 call through the existing 911 network; (2) providing a callback number to PSAP; and (3) providing initial location information to PSAP (optional).

Phase Two Certification based on the NENA/VON Coalition long-term solution would include (1) delivering a 911 call through an IP network to an IP-connected PSAP or through an existing 911 network if PSAP is not IP-connected; (2) providing a callback number or recontact information to PSAP; and (3) providing caller location information to PSAP. This phased approach enables near-immediate implementation of emergency services. It also encourages a move away from traditional emergency services toward a more competitive environment.

C. Labeling

This Article has noted throughout that labeling could be an important aspect of the certification process. While the details of such a mechanism warrant a separate analysis, this Subpart briefly proposes a labeling

178. Id.
179. Id.
initiative, discusses its merits, and provides suggestions regarding the manner in which it might be used.

Labeling may include such concrete and diverse elements as (1) an identifiable sticker attached to IP phones showing the name of the certifying organization and the address of a website that provides certification details and updates; (2) a software window that periodically reminds users of emergency services specifications, possibly when the device or software detects some configuration change; and/or (3) an e-mail sent to the user when the network detects a change in its configuration.

By tying the operation of the label to system changes, the label becomes a dynamic mechanism that could become very useful in situations when the network and the device cannot automate the proper operation of the emergency services system (i.e., when a user might need to intervene). Lastly, considering the litigious nature of our society, labeling likely provides some legal protection to the VoIP service or software provider. In other words, labeling could be used to provide users with information about the (1) availability or lack of emergency services support; (2) emergency services limitations; (3) configuration requirements; (4) configuration changes; and (5) alternative methods of summoning help.

VI. CONCLUSION

While the telecommunications industry has proven adept at self-regulating in areas of interoperability, social policy regulation has historically been the purview of the government. The diversity engendered through the transition to VoIP will challenge such command-and-control regulatory policies, and we believe the time has come to consider the alternative of social policy self-regulation. There are key challenges that arise from a self-regulatory process, but the framework provided in this Article offers a solution. Success in this area would not only provide substantial value in the case of VoIP emergency services, but it would also add a vital new regulatory approach for use within the telecommunications industry, which continues to evolve rapidly.

VoIP technology enables a much broader range of technical and business approaches than were feasible in the PSTN world. On the one hand, this new technical reality heralds a new era of innovation and flexibility for users, while on the other hand it makes difficult—or, more likely, impossible—the task of mapping traditional social policy goals and constructs from the PSTN world to the VoIP world in a straightforward manner. Many current social policy goals should be preserved in one form or another and new policy goals should be considered over time. With these thoughts in mind, it seems we would be well-served by a more flexible, rapid, and innovative method of mapping such goals onto the increasingly
heterogeneous world of telecommunications.

Emergency services are a critically important and immediate case in point. Traditional emergency services expectations include connection of timely, highly intelligible emergency calls with the appropriate answering point and communication of critical information regarding the call’s place of origin, both as a network address and as a physical location. The variety of VoIP implementations makes these expectations intrinsically difficult to meet. Thus, this Article proposes that the industry design—using input from the government and other stakeholders—a multi-tier certification scheme that will provide a VoIP emergency services capability that can fully satisfy these expectations. The certification regime should focus on several key technical characteristics of VoIP systems, including addressing, routing, location, security, availability, and related network and application standards.

This analysis is not complete in some important respects. From the technology perspective, a broad set of technology categories should be developed that might be based on media type, network access, user expectations, or some other criteria. Within these categories, a set of characteristics should be defined, upon which a certification process could be applied as this Article laid out above for VoIP. While this Article presents some basic legal analysis and inquiry into the role of standardization and consortia in institutional design, more research is needed in this area: for example, how social policy funding will be affected by the transition to VoIP (e.g., telecommunications industry taxation helps to fund public safety, and it will be important to determine if these obligations will be transferred to VoIP or if they will be covered in some other way). Finally, this Article briefly discussed the importance of developing different categories of VoIP implementations against which different certification standards might be developed. Further investigation could allow this approach to expand to include other types of media over IP (e.g., instant messages and video).

Finally, the proposed model needs both refinement and assessment. The Authors have evaluated the model by performing critical and documented analysis of internal integrity and credibility with respect to successful precedents and by disseminating this analysis to policy-oriented audiences for critique and debate (as has been done by submitting a preliminary version of this Article to the Telecommunications Policy Research Conference).180 Moreover, the analysis from Parts II and III demonstrate the validity of the authors’ approach. For the longer term, this

analysis was derived through the use of the proposed model, as well as through the execution of specific strategies for assessing that model once it is implemented. As part of this strategy, the Authors (1) monitored elements that evolved beyond the scope of this paper’s technical and business model; (2) tracked specific performance metrics of certified processes and compared that data against criteria derived from consumer expectations and social policy goals; and (3) compared voluntary adoption rates of certification against a template derived from the Authors’ experience in industry-sponsored certification processes. This longer-term assessment represents an ongoing effort that can benefit greatly from reader feedback. To that end, comments are welcome.